Request for Urgent Intervention by the Office of High Commissioner

To: Volker Türk, United Nations High Commission for Human Rights

Dear Mr. Türk,

We, the undersigned civil society organizations, are writing to bring your attention and request your urgent intervention in what we believe to be a pressing human rights emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh in the face of a growing risk of military escalation, leading to possible crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Some of these risks and warning signs have already been acknowledged by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination as well as the International Court of Justice. In accordance with the Human Rights Council’s resolution A/HRC/RES/45/31 on the prevention of human rights violations,[1] we request that you consider an urgent OHCHR mission to Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Lachin corridor, the only lifeline that connects Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and the world with a view to monitor rights to life, food, health, peace, freedom of movement as well as a range of other rights. We also believe it would be extremely important to launch a longer-term monitoring mission along the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, given how the rights of local communities in Armenia have been impacted following the September 2022 attack of Azerbaijan against Armenia proper, which resulted in occupation of certain bordering territories of Armenia. In the spirit of “never again”, we strongly believe the time to act is now. Below we provide a more detailed overview of the situation.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh

For over 100 days, since December 12, 2022, the Lachin corridor has been blocked by self-proclaimed and Baku-supported activists, effectively creating a humanitarian crisis for its roughly 120,000 Armenian population.[2] This is despite the ruling of the International Court of Justice on February 22, ordering Azerbaijan to “ensure unimpeded movement” on the road connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.[3] Despite persistent international calls to unblock the corridor, including the latest resolution by the EU Parliament and the statement by PACE’s Committee on Legal Affairs, these pleas have been ignored.[4] Only a very limited amount of food and medication is arriving through Russian peacekeepers as well as ICRC, the only international organization that has access to the region. As of February and March, we are witnessing renewed provocations by Azerbaijan, including shooting at villagers doing agricultural work, as well as the killing of three police officers not far from Stepanakert on March 5.[5] On March 25, in violation of the trilateral ceasefire statement of November 2020, Azerbaijani troops crossed the contact line and occupied a new position.[6] This move is part of a known tactic to gradually tighten the grip around Nagorno-Karabakh and gradually seize new territories. The situation leaves little doubt that Baku is determined to create impossible living conditions for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, effectively forcing them out of the region.

Due to shortages of basic supplies and food, educational institutions have been working with interruptions, and some schools and kindergartens have been forced to close. Around 900 people have been deprived of necessary medical treatment. Access to medicine is severely limited, especially for children, and troubling reports indicate that children are being given adult medications due to these shortages.[7] Since the blockade, approximately 3,900 individuals have been separated from their homes. During the 100 days of blockade, Azerbaijan disrupted the supply of natural gas to Nagorno-Karabakh for a total 34 days. Food rationing has been in effect since January. Persons with disabilities, including those living in residential institutions, face increasingly difficult circumstances as access to medicine and specialized dietary requirements become scarcer with each passing day.[8] Since January 9, the only high-voltage power line between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh has been cut in the territory under Azerbaijani control. The Azerbaijani side does not allow specialists to enter and restore the power supply. As a result, electricity blackouts have been introduced. It is also noteworthy that 782 business entities (18.3% of the total) have suspended their activities. Around 9,800 people (including state-supported temporary work placements and more than 50% of private sector workers) have lost jobs and sources of income because of the impact on the economy and disruptions of vital infrastructure. Construction of housing for internally displaced persons following the 2020 war been stopped altogether.[9]

Baku continues to maintain that the Lachin corridor is open. Moreover, it considers the rights of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh as an internal matter, even refusing to recognize the very existence of such a territory.[10] Despite President Aliyev’s announcement at the Munich Security Conference about being open to discussing the rights of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh through direct negotiations between Stepanakert and Baku, there has been no progress.[11] Such negotiations are critical, but absent a transparent and international mechanism for mediation, Baku will continue to stick to its coercive tactics without any consideration of rights of Armenians. Baku also demands a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, alleging that Armenia is using the road to illegally transfer military forces to Nagorno-Karabakh, which appears to be a convenient pretext for preparing an escalation. Armenia denies these allegations, explaining that only a local small self-defense force is in place to protect the local population.[12] The recent report by the International Crisis Group confirms that Armenia withdrew all its forces after the 2020 war.[13] The Russian peacekeeping force, installed in Nagorno-Karabakh in accordance with the November 9, 2020, statement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, is often unable to respond to the crisis on the ground.

The official Baku continues to apply coercive tactics and maintains its hateful and antagonistic rhetoric towards Armenia.[14] In a speech earlier this March, President Aliyev stated: “There is one condition for them [Armenians] to live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers [the size of the Republic of Armenia] – Armenia must accept our conditions”.[15] On November 8, 2022, he made explicit threats to use force against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, stating that if they did not meet the demands of the Azerbaijani side, “they will see our fist again.”[16] In October 2022, President Aliyev stated that if Armenians did not want to become citizens of Azerbaijan they could leave.[17] The dehumanization of Armenians in Azerbaijani narratives is widely accepted and enjoys impunity. Earlier this March, one of the “activists” posted a video from the blockaded section of the Lachin corridor threatening to slaughter Armenians and use their blood in kebab.[18] The official position towards Armenians fuels this kind of mood in the public.

In December 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) passed an order of provisional measures, stating that Republic of Azerbaijan must “Take all necessary measures to prevent the incitement and promotion of racial hatred and discrimination, including by its officials and public institutions, targeted at persons of Armenian national or ethnic origin.”[19] In August 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) published its findings on Azerbaijan, where it stated that the Committee is “deeply concerned about allegations of grave human rights violations committed by the Azerbaijani military forces against prisoners of war and other protected persons of Armenian ethnic or national origin.”[20] Perhaps one of the most vivid example of Armenophobia was the opening of the infamous trophy park in Azerbaijan after the 44-Day War, where grotesque wax models of Armenian soldiers were presented.[21] Azerbaijan has also launched a campaign of either destroying or appropriating Armenian cultural monuments, while important UN stakeholders such as UNESCO are not allowed access to the territory.[22] The hostile narratives that dehumanize Armenians fuel acts of vandalism and normalize a behavior that can be characterized as genocidal. The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention has issued several Red Flag alerts for Genocide by Azerbaijan against ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Put together, the actions and rhetoric paint a holistic picture of the dangerous situation that Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh face.

Aggression against Armenia

On September 13, 2022, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive operation along the entire Eastern and South-Eastern border with Armenia, striking military targets and civilian infrastructure alike, in gross violation of the UN Charter and Geneva Conventions. Armenia has reported 207 killed and missing persons, including 3 civilian casualties.[23] At least 20 military personnel have been captured as prisoners of war,[24] and there is reliable evidence of war crimes committed, including against women.[25] Although there was international outcry and diplomatic efforts, preventing a further military invasion, the threat of a new escalation remains continuous.

Azerbaijan uses these attacks to put pressure the Armenian side to get the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” a land connection to Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani exclave West of Armenia, at the expense of Armenia’s sovereign territory. Moreover, Baku often refers to Western Azerbaijan, which is an irredentist political concept mostly to refer to the territory of Armenia. In December 2022, Azerbaijan initiated its “Great Return” campaign which ostensibly promotes the settlement of ethnic Azerbaijanis who once lived in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. At its inauguration speech, President Aliyev declared: “Present-day Armenia is our land.”[26]

In a welcome development and to help stabilize the situation on the border between the two countries, as of January 2023, the European Union has deployed a civilian monitoring mission called EU Mission in Armenia, tasked with observing and reporting on the situation on the ground, contributing to human security, and contributing to build confidence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The mission operates on the Armenian side of the border, given that Baku refuses to collaborate. EUMA is widely seen in Armenia as a force for stability, however its mere presence does not guarantee a new large-scale military attack by Azerbaijan.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this context, an adequate and uncompromising international response is urgently needed in order to prevent any further escalation and a possible large-scale attack on Nagorno-Karabakh and/or Armenia proper. Although there are currently no active hostilities, the gravity of the situation cannot be underestimated. The power vacuum associated with Russia’s war in Ukraine creates an additional layer of fragility in the region, risking becoming a cover for human rights violations and crimes, potentially drawing in powerful geopolitical actors such as Turkey and Iran in case there is a serious escalation. In addition to being a profound challenge to the region’s security, a new conflict would also put an end to Armenia’s fragile democracy, while sending a message that the use of force can go unpunished. We strongly believe that consistent international attention and a physical presence on the ground are crucial to stabilizing the situation and preventing human rights atrocities and possible ethnic cleansing, and the High Commissioner should play a leading role here. Without proper attention and intervention, there is a risk of discrediting human rights mechanisms designed to prevent serious human rights abuses.

Our recommendations are as follows:

  • Publicly condemn the blockade of the Lachin corridor, including during relevant sessions of the Human Rights Council.
  • Request and organize an urgent OHCHR mission to Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Lachin corridor to monitor the rights to life, food, health, peace, freedom of movement, and other rights and publish the findings of this mission as well as brief States, such as at an inter-sessional meeting of the UN Human Rights Council.
  • Request and deploy a longer-term monitoring OHCHR mission along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a preventive measure against the further use of force and human rights abuses. In contrast with the EUMA, such a mission wouldhave an explicit human rights mandate and provide independent public reporting on the human rights situation on the ground and would seek to have a mandate also in Azerbaijan.  

 

Signed by:

International Service for Human Rights
“Association of Women with University Education” Social Organization, Armenia
“For Equal Rights” NGO
Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation
Coalition of Domestic Violence Support Centers
Democracy Development Foundation
Disability Rights Agenda NGO
Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly-Vanadzor NGO
Journalists Club Asparez NGO
Law Development and Protection Foundation
Peace Dialogue NGO
Protection of Rights without Borders NGO
Public Journalism Club NGO
Regional Centre for Democracy and Security
Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center NGO
Union of Informed Citizens NGO
Women Resource Center NGO
Women’s Support Center NGO

[1] UN Human Rights Council. (2020, October 14). Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 7 October 2020 (A/HRC/RES/45/31). https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G20/265/17/PDF/G2026517.pdf?OpenElement.

[2] “Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted.” Amnesty International, February 9, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-putting-thousands-of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/; “The 100th day of the Lachin corridor blockade.” JAMnews, March 21, 2023, https://jam-news.net/100th-day-of-the-lachin-corridor-blockade/.

[3] International Court of Justice (2023, February 22). Application of the International Convention on the Elimination

of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia V. Azerbaijan): Order. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/180/180-20230222-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.

[4] European Parliament. (2023, January 19). European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh (2023/2504(RSP)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0012_EN.html; Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe. (2023, March 22). Statement by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on the obstruction of the Lachin Corridor. https://rm.coe.int/statement-by-the-committee-on-legal-affairs-and-human-rights-on-the-ob/1680aaa6d8.

[5] Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Artsakh. (2023, March 21). Report on the Violations of Individual and Collective Human Rights as a Result of Azerbaijan’s Blockade of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) (100 Days). https://artsakhombuds.am/en/document/1004.

[6] Joshua Kucera. (2023, March 26). “Azerbaijani armed forces advance to close off Armenia-Karabakh road.” EurasiaNet. https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijani-armed-forces-advance-to-close-off-armenia-karabakh-road.

[7] “Nagorno-Karabakh: Empty shops and blockade pile pressure on Armenians.” BBC News, January 6, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64174164.

[8] International Disability Alliance, European Disability Forum. (2023, January 18). Joint statement on the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, Nagorno-Karabakh. https://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/blog/joint-statement-blockade-lachin-corridor-nagorno-karabakh

[9] Artsakh Government Update | Day 107 Under Blockade: Bulletin | No.51 | 24-27.03.23. Artsakh Info Centre, March 27, 2023. https://mailchi.mp/c73a120816c2/day107en?e=3d646cadf6.

[10] “The issue of rights and security of Armenians living in Karabakh is an internal matter of Azerbaijan; Hajiev.” Radar Armenia, March 13, 2022. https://radar.am/en/news/politics-2557317997/.

[11] Ani Avetisynan, Ismi Aghaev. (2023, February 20). “Aliyev: any mention of Nagorno-Karabakh in peace deal is unacceptable.” OC-Media. https://oc-media.org/aliyev-any-mention-of-nagorno-karabakh-in-peace-deal-is-unacceptable/.

[12] “Yerevan Opposes Azeri Checkpoint at Lachin Corridor.” RFE/RL’s Armenian service, February 22, 2023. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32283132.html.

[13] International Crisis Group. (2023, January 30). Averting a New War between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Report No 266). https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/266-averting-new-war-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan.

[14] UN Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (2022, August 30). Concluding Observations on the Combined Tenth and Twelfth Periodic Reports on Azerbaijan (CERD/C/AZE/CO/10-12), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fAZE%2fCO%2f10-12&Lang=en.

[15] Joshua Kucera. (2023, March 24). “International diplomacy picks up amid rising fears of violence in Karabakh.” EurasiaNet. https://eurasianet.org/international-diplomacy-picks-up-amid-rising-fears-of-violence-in-karabakh

[16] “Supreme Commander-in-Chief: ‘Armenia should not forget the lessons of the second Karabakh war’.” Report News Agency, November 8, 2022, https://report.az/en/domestic-politics/supreme-commander-in-chief-armenia-should-not-forget-the-lessons-of-the-second-karabakh-war/.

[17] “Aliyev: Armenians of Karabakh who don’t want Azeri citizenship can leave.” PanArmenian.net, October 7, 2022, https://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/302978/Aliyev_Armenians_of_Karabakh_who_dont_want_Azeri_citizenship_can_leave.

[18] “Appalling video from Lachin Corridor shows Azeri ‘eco-activist’ threatening to SLAUGHTER Armenians for KEBAB.” Armenpress, March 21, 2023. https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1106803/.

[19] International Court of Justice (2021, December 7). Application of the International Convention on the Elimination

of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia V. Azerbaijan): Order. https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/180/180-20211207-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.

[20] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination publishes findings on Azerbaijan, Benin, Nicaragua, Slovakia, Suriname, United States of America and Zimbabwe. (2022, August 30). UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/08/un-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination-publishes-findings-azerbaijan.

[21] Neil Hauer. (2021, April 22). “Azerbaijan’s ‘Ethnic Hatred’ Theme Park Draws Ire, Imperils Reconciliation. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.” https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-karabakh-theme-park-armenia-ethnic-hatred-aliyev/31217971.html.

[22] Simon Maghakyan. (2022, March 24). “A Vicious Circle of Cultural Erasure in Azerbaijan: Can spiritual and political leaders step up and end the conflict with Armenia?” The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-vicious-circle-of-cultural-erasure-azerbaijan-armenia-culture-muslim-christian-sites-11648151998; European Parliament (2022, March 10). European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2022 on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh (2022/2582(RSP)). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0080_EN.html.

[23] “Armenia raises number of dead, missing to 207.” Civilnet, September 19, 2022. https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/675702/armenia-raises-number-of-dead-missing-to-207/.

[24] Siranush Ghazanchyan. (2022, September 27). “Lack of accountability likely to lead to increased aggression, Armenian envoy tells UN.” Public Radio of Armenia. https://en.armradio.am/2022/09/27/azerbaijans-latest-attacks-prove-that-in-the-absence-of-accountability-aggression-likely-to-increase-armenian-envoy-tells-un/.

[25] Ani Avetisyan. (2022, September 16). “Footage appears to show desecration of female Armenian soldier.” OC-Media. https://oc-media.org/footage-appears-to-show-desecration-of-female-armenian-soldier/.

[26] Joshua Kucera. (2023, January 17). “Azerbaijan seeks “Great Return” of refugees to Armenia.” Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-seeks-great-return-of-refugees-to-armenia